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the	case.	17	More	than	a	sheer	copy,	the	clinical	picture	as	picture	expresses	a	mimetical	happening	in	reality:	through	the	picture	epistemic	access	is	gained	to	the	world,	to	the	“scene”	of	medicine	(Broekman,	1993,	122).	Stronger	formulated:	the	clinical	picture	is	depiction	and	expression	(Darstellung)	of	a	reality:	however,	it	is	depiction	not	only	of	a	physical	reality	(disease),	but	includes	the	medical	reality	(the	medical	discourse)	as	well.	And	to	inflect	this	idea	with	the	import	of	Heidegger’s	example	of	a	piece	of	equipment:	similar	to	a	piece	of	equipment	(such	as	a	hammer)	that	could	only	function	as	such	within	a	whole	world	of	circumspective	concern,	we	could	argue	that	the	clinical	picture	can	only	serve	its	function	within	the	whole	medical	context	of	concern	(Heidegger,	1962,	BT	§	15,	97-98).			 This	complements	the	previous	discussion	of	clinical	pictures	in	important	ways.	Instead	of	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	being	only	the	depiction	and	instantiation	of	disease,	this	implies	that	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	may	additionally	refer	to	medical	nosology	itself.	Instead	of	being	sole	referents	to	an	external	reality,	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	thus	also	become	internal	referents	to	the	meaning,	functioning	and	context	of	the	medical	practice	itself	(Broekman,	1993,	110).			 To	grasp	this	additional,	alternative	story	of	the	meaning	and	reference	of	clinical	pictures,	Plato’s	complex	and	engaging	ideas	on	mimesis	can,	once	again,	offer	a	guide.	This	time	Plato’s	Phaedrus	might	suit	us	well	to	offer	illustration	of	the	ambiguous	nature	of	referents	such	as	images	and	texts.18	In	Plato’s	retelling	of	the	Egyptian	myth	about	the	origin	of	writing,	Theuth,	the	god	of	writing,	instructs	King	Thamus	to	disseminate	writing	among	the	people.	The	gift	that	is	given	is	as	ambivalent	as	a	pharmakon:	while	according	to	the	God	it	is	a	medicine	(pharmakon)	to	aid	memory	and	wisdom,	King	Thamus	perceives	it	as	a	poison	(274e6;	pharmakon)	that	introduces	forgetfulness,	a	vague	calling-to-mind	(hypomnēsis)	that	fosters	the	appearance	of	wisdom,	but	not	its	reality.	Texts,	like	images,	may	thus	be	solely	functioning	as	dead	reiterations,	semblances,	without	active	connection	to	knowledge	and	reality.			 In	this	negative	view	of	written	words,	they	remain	silent,	like	painted	images,	and	cannot	defend	themselves.	These	referents	need	their	author,	their	“father,”	for	support	(275e4)	and	without	that	they	remain	at	risk	of	being	misinterpreted.	Because	of	the	risk	of	misinterpretation,	writers	(and	thinkers)	have	to	be	very	careful	in	choosing	their	audience.	Just	like	a	farmer	anticipating	the	most	proper	time	to	seed	plants	(276b-c),	those	who	write	need	to	be	similarly	“sensible	
																																																								17	Clinical	pictures	in	psychiatry	and	psychopathology	show	their	indeterminacy	and	instability,	however,	more	clearly	than	other	kinds	of	clinical	pictures,	as	Broekman	also	notes	(Broekman,	1993,	108).		18	Similar	to	the	general	idea	of	images	articulated	in	this	section,	namely	seeing	them	as	being	part	of	a	network	of	images,	I	am	speaking	here	of	words	and	text	in	a	similar,	post-structural	sense,	namely	seeing	them	as	part	of	a	network	of	symbols,	not	just	as	one-directional,	unambiguous		references.		
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with	seeds”	(276c)	and	carefully	consider	and	choose	those	souls	that	are	ready	to	receive	them	(276e-277a).19			 What	Plato’s	story	illustrates	so	clearly	and	beautifully	is	the	power	and	undecided	meaning	of	referents	such	as	texts	and	images.	Plato	warns	against	words	and	images	precisely	because	of	his	understanding	that	their	power	is	so	great	and	that	their	meaning	is	so	ambivalent:	ideally	the	author	should	come	to	the	rescue	and	select	the	audience	within	which	these	referents	can	take	root.	Of	course,	Plato	knows	that	this	“rescue”	is	impossible,	and	that	his	own	images	–	infinite	in	depth	and	breadth,	including	not	only	the	images	and	stories	such	as	the	Myth	of	Er	or	the	
Allegory	of	the	Cave,	but	the	entire	composition	of	his	whole	oeuvre	–	will	and	should	abandon	their	author.	The	freedom	and	creativity	that	instills	images	and	texts	with	their	power,	comes	with	the	price	of	realizing	and	accepting	that	those	texts	and	images	necessarily	have	to	abandon	their	author	and	acquire	their	meaning	within	new	systems	of	referents,	with	new	interpreters	and	new	susceptibilities.	This	is	the	risk	of	any	referent	that	remains.			 While	Plato	might	point	us	to	the	ambivalence	of	referents	as	a	risk,	Derrida’s	reading	of	the	Phaedrus	in	Plato’s	Pharmacy	embraces	this	ambiguity	wholeheartedly	and	tries	to	dismantle	the	preference	Plato	gives	–	at	least	superficially	–	to	speaking	(Derrida,	1981,	139).	Following	Derrida’s	trajectory,	i.e.	embracing	the	ambivalence	of	pictures	and	texts,	would	be	very	productive	for	our	project	to	grasp	the	origin	and	meaning	of	clinical	pictures	in	the	world	of	medicine,	because	it	might	have	the	benefit	of	acquiring	insights	into	offering	alternative	kinds	of	stories	or	images.			 How	might	this	work?	Similar	to	the	meaning	and	structure	common	to	the	
pharmakon	and	writing,	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	both	include	the	meaning	of	remedy	and	poison	as	well	as	all	gradations	between.	For	instance,	medicine’s	clinical	picture	of	a	broken	hip	and	its	associated	treatment	can	offer	the	remedy	that	its	clinical	picture	ideally	purports	to	provide.	However,	I	want	to	argue	that	this	clinical	picture	may	also	deceive,	and	possibly	function	even	as	a	poison,	insofar	as	this	clinical	picture	might	fail	the	patient:	for	instance	there	where	hip	replacement	encounters	complications	–	an	improper	fit,	an	infection,	an	improperly	manufactured	artificial	joint,	disability,	even	death.	All	these	complications,	one	could	argue,	are	not	just	secondary,	but	precisely	reveal	and	bring	out	what	is	usually	
forgotten:	namely	that	the	clinical	picture,	even	of	a	simple	broken	joint,	does	not	only,	not	even	predominantly,	refer	to	a	disease	or	simple	fracture,	but	involves	the	
whole	context	of	referents	that	make	this	image	possible:	accidents,	old	age,	osteoporosis,	surgeons,	patients,	scalpels,	hygiene,	bacteria,	pharmaceutical	companies,	capitalism,	greed,	science,	etc.			 In	fact,	if	we	pursue	this	arc	of	thinking	further,	following	Derrida’s	fruitful	reading	of	Plato’s	pharmakon,	we	could	argue	that	concepts	and	practices	such	as																																																									19	Plato	emphasizes	the	endless	fecundity	of	such	“sowing	of	words,”	for	instance	when	he	writes	that	the	dialectician	“chooses	a	proper	soul	and	plants	and	sows	within	it	discourse	accompanied	by	knowledge	–	discourse	capable	of	helping	itself	as	well	as	the	man	who	planted	it,	which	is	not	barren	but	produces	a	seed	from	which	more	discourse	grows	in	the	character	of	others”	(276e).			
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those	operating	in	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	may	produce	empirical	truths,	but	also	acquire	meaning	in	textual,	conceptual	and	cultural	chains,	in	which	one	concept	refers	to	and	syntactically	plays	with	the	others.20	Accordingly,	in	addition	to	entailing	certain	empirical	truths,	clinical	pictures	acquire	meaning	through	their	dependence	upon	other	pictures,	concepts,	and	practices.	This	makes	the	meaning	of	clinical	pictures	relatively	unstable,	since	the	network	of	concepts	and	practices	upon	which	they	depend,	and	the	context	within	which	they	are	perceived,	is	always	subject	to	change.		 If	we	assess	historical	descriptions	of	particular	diseases,	we	find	ourselves	constantly	confronted	with	the	flexibility	and	instability	of	medicine’s	clinical	pictures,	pointing	towards	a	latent	anarchy	and	undecidability	underlying	all	pictures	(cf.	Broekman,	1993,	118).	For	instance,	the	tuberculosis	as	Thomas	Mann	describes	it	in	The	Magic	Mountain	is	an	example	of	a	disease	that	we	no	longer	know	in	our	culture,	that	is	to	say:	we	know	it,	but	in	a	totally	different	way,	associated	with	other	images.	Whereas	we	currently	view	it	as	a	disease	mostly	associated	with	drug-addicts	and	HIV,	and	treat	it	with	antibiotics,	Hans	Castorp	in	the	Magic	Mountain	experiences	it	predominantly	as	a	disease	of	reclusion,	necessitating	clean	mountain	air,	prolonged	residency	and	medical	institutionalization,	with	suffering	and	death	looming	all	too	close.			 This	historical	evolution	of	the	meaning	of	the	clinical	picture	of	tuberculosis	shows	that	clinical	pictures	do	not	adhere	to	strict,	permanent	ontologies,	but	find	themselves	in	a	Heraclitean	flux	of	meaning.	This	flux	of	meaning	is	particularly	strong	in	our	current	technological	age,	where	images	are	exponentially	replicated	and,	seemingly,	come	to	live,	and	live	on,	by	their	own	device.	As	Michael	Naas	poignantly	puts	it	in	Derrida	From	Now	On:	“Postmodernity	is	thus	the	time	of	specters,	of	images,	sounds,	and	digital	imprints	that	all	outlive,	or	at	least	potentially	outlive,	the	things	they	purport	to	represent.	In	postmodernity,	the	image	is	no	longer	three	removes	from	the	real	(...),	but	something	more	powerful	and	in	some	sense	more	real	than	the	real	itself”	(Naas,	2008,	180).		
3.	The	Need	to	Access	and	Produce	Supplemental	Images	
of	Disease	and	Suffering	I	want	to	argue	that,	instead	of	denying	its	pictorial	character,	medicine	would	do	well	in	our	current	postmodern	age	to	confirm	its	pictorial	character,	to	abandon	the	idea	that	it	is	the	sole	proprietor	and	mirror	of	the	reality	of	disease,	and	to	allow	room	for	the	creation	of	other	stories,	of	other	images,	of	other	meanings.	It	needs	to	realize	the	gap	between	concept	and	natural	world.	Much	like	Plato’s	advice	to	the	writers	of	words,	medicine	should	carefully	and	responsibly	handle	its	authorship	and	know	in	what	situations	–	and	in	which	existentially	dire	situations	–	its	images	may	no	longer	bear	fruit,	even	if	its	epistemic	truths	are	correct.	Given	the																																																									20	In	this	way,	Derrida	shows	how	Plato’s	own	use	of	the	term	‘pharmakon’	is	dependent	on	many	other	terms	(Derrida,	1981,	130).	
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context,	and	given	the	number	of	variables	in	existential	situations,	these	medical	truths,	while	accurate,	may	fail	to	provide	meaning	to	the	living	reality	of	disease	and	suffering.	For	many	instances	of	disease,	medicine	is	the	correct	“author”	of	the	image	of	disease,	but	limit	cases	show	the	boundaries	of	its	authorship	and	application.		Much	like	Plato	suggests	in	his	famous	Allegory	of	the	Cave,	discerning	pictures	as	pictures	is	not	only	epistemologically	necessary	but,	most	importantly,	ethically	warranted.	Accordingly,	when	it	fails	to	recognize	the	pictorial	character	of	its	clinical	pictures,	medicine	needs	to	realize	that	it	otherwise	threatens	to	serve	its	own	theory	more	than	the	being	ill	of	the	patient.	The	illness	that	patients	experience	is	singular,	unique,	open	and	indeterminate	–	just	as	each	individual	being	is.	This	indeterminacy	cannot	be	translated	into	generalizations,	which	prioritize	collectivity	over	individuality.	And	certainly	in	the	case	of	chronic,	debilitating,	or	terminal	illnesses,	what	may	offer	strength	is	a	return	and	confirmation	of	individuality,	and	a	release	from	the	general	view	and	statistics.	What	matters	in	those	pivotal	experiences	is	not	only	the	ascription	to	a	treatment	–	or	the	lack	thereof	–	but	to	live	in	and	with	an	illness	as	best	as	one	can.21			 If	mimesis	finds	its	strength	in	the	need	to	play	and	simulate	and	create,	then	limit	cases	show	the	necessity	to	escape	the	tight	grip	that	medicine	has	had	on	images	of	disease	and	the	need	to	supplement	its	ownership	and	diversify	it.	Perhaps	even	better,	prior	to	discovering	that	medicine	may	offer	no	solution	in	the	case	of	such	painful	circumstances,	patients	and	doctors	alike	would	do	well	to	be	prepared	for	the	strength	of	mimesis	–	in	both	a	positive	and	negative	sense.	Creating	truths	and	falsehoods	alike,	as	well	as	hope	and	despair,	mimesis	remains	elusive	and	that	is	precisely	its	strength.	Moreover,	we	need	to	arrive	at	the	realization	that	our	own	lives	are	always	already	centered	around	representation,	and	that	we	need	to	tap	into	the	inner	mimetic	resources	with	which	we	already	live.	As	Broekman	poignantly	writes:	“every	human	state	is	a	representation,	is	itself	scenic	insofar	as	it	is	involved	in	its	own	representation,	its	own	work	on	language	and	concept,	its	own	meaning	and	mis-en-scène”	(Broekman,	1993,	110).22		 However,	is	this	to	say	that	anything	goes	and	that	any	image	can	work?	This	is	an	important	point	to	consider,	especially	since	I	do	not	want	to	plea	for	relativism	or	want	to	support	those	kinds	of	images	that	simply	deny	to	medicine	some	of	its	hard-fought,	rational	truths,	which	are	hashed	out	in	propositions	such	as	“this	patient	has	breast	cancer”	or	“this	patient	is	allergic	to	penicillin”	or	“celiac																																																									21	A	case	in	point	is	the	powerful	phenomenological	analysis	of	Kay	Toombs,	describing	her	life	living	with	multiple	sclerosis.	Her	illness,	she	writes,	is	not	that	of	“abnormal	reflexes,”	but	rather	that	of	“the	impossibility	of	taking	a	walk	around	the	block,	or	climbing	the	stairs	to	reach	the	second	floor	in	my	house,	or	of	carrying	a	cup	of	coffee	from	the	kitchen	to	the	den”	(Toombs,	2001,	247).	Karin	Spaink	is	also	an	example	of	a	(Dutch)	writer	thematizing	her	life	living	with	multiple	sclerosis	as	well	as	breast	cancer.	See	for	instance	her	autobiography	Vallende	vrouw	(1993),	and	her	book	about	breast	cancer	Open	en	Bloot	(2006).		22	The	Dutch	here	has	“scènisch,”	which	Broekman	uses	to	evoke	the	dramaturgy,	the	“mis-en-scène,”	within	which	the	images	and	meanings	of	life	are	embedded.			
	 14	
disease	requires	a	gluten-free	diet.”23	Anti-rational	or	anti-scientific	images	are	not	the	kind	of	images	that	I	think	would	ultimately	help	a	patient	with	a	chronic	or	terminal	illness;	in	fact,	they	may	be	counterproductive.	Rather,	what	is	needed	is	an	alternative,	additional	epistemic	tool	that	provides	context,	and	complementarity,	to	the	field	of	medicine	in	its	creation	of	images.	What	may	bring	about	a	different	organization	of	the	network	space	around	disease	and	illness,	such	that	the	visceral	experience	of	disease	may	be	attested	to?	The	answer,	I	will	articulate,	is	art.			
4.	Concluding	Remarks	and	Artistic	Applications:	Re-
Imagining	Breast	Cancer	Art	is,	in	my	perspective,	one	of	these	epistemic	tools	that	provide	access	to	a	form	of	image	production	that	serves	as	a	complement	to	conceptual,	representative	thinking	(Adorno	and	Horkheimer,	1969,	19).	Art	and	its	mimetic	production	may	provide	an	alternative	complement	to	a	field	such	as	medicine	since	it	offers	images	that	provide	a	non-competitive,	yet	enriching	way	to	grasp	disease	and	illness.	It	interjects	into	the	network	space	around	disease	and	illness	a	different	kind	of	image,	one	that	is	non-discursive	and	speaks	to	the	unique,	visceral	aspects	of	life,	without	claiming	adequatio	between	its	image	and	reality.		Following	Adorno	and	Horkheimer,	the	kind	of	mimesis	at	stake	here	does	not	include	the	controlling	assimilation	of	reality	(Adorno	and	Horkheimer,	1969,	15),	but	is	characterized	by	the	production	of	images	within	an	uncontrollable,	free	submission	or	“adhesion”	to	reality:	Anschmiegung	(Adorno	and	Horkheimer,	1969,	26).	Unburdened	and	undetermined	by	a	priori	categories,	this	mimetical	process	may	accordingly	hear	the	voice	of	reality	more	clearly,	in	its	unique	otherness,	while	opening	up	to	the	realization	that	this	reality	may	never	be	completely	grasped	nor	represented	(Adorno,	1966,	28).	Importantly,	this	form	of	mimesis	may	thus	prevent	more	theoretically	and	scientifically	rigorous	forms	of	representation,	such	as	the	discourse	of	medicine,	from	becoming	victim	to	their	own	totalizing	moments.		Should	we	start	looking	for	actual	images	that	tap	into	this,	other,	mimetically	more	playful	and	artistic	register,	the	images	produced	are	perhaps	not	what	we	find	easy,	comfortable,	or	even	pleasurable.	The	images	may	be	raw,	uncensored,	and	crude.	In	some	cases,	there	may	be	no	further	hope	conveyed,	no	higher	ultimate	meaning,	no	sublation.	I	was	recently	drawn	to	large-scale	portraits	that	fashion	photographer	David	Jay	has	taken	of	young	breast	cancer	survivors	as	part	of	what	is	called	“The	SCAR	Project,”	with	the	subtitle	“Breast	Cancer	is	Not	a	Pink	Ribbon.”24	It	takes	courage	to	look	at	these	pictures,	and	–	I	can	only	imagine	–	even	more	courage	for	these	patients	to	agree	to	be	photographed.	These	images	are	images	from	beyond	the	pink	ribbon	of	trendy	mainstream,	capitalist-infused,	commercial	perspectives	(Hernandez	1998).	The	glamorous	style	of	these																																																									23	The	insights	here	are	due	to	a	careful	reading	of	this	paper	by	Dorothea	Olkowski,	for	which	I	am	very	grateful.	24	http://www.thescarproject.org/mission.	Accessed	June	22,	2017.		
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photographs	playfully	invokes	the	fashionable	commercialism	associated	with	the	pink	ribbon	campaign,	while	its	raw	content	instantly	dismisses	the	naïve	image	of	hope	and	recovery	that	this	campaign	promotes.	Instead,	we	see	young	bodies	with	enormous	scars	and	no	breast	tissue	remaining,	we	see	asymmetry,	we	see	breast	tissue	without	nipples,	we	see	burnt	skin,	we	see	loneliness	or	partners	gently	and	vulnerably	holding	their	loved	ones.	In	those	pictures,	we	find	no	higher,	generalized	concepts,	but	contradictory	assemblages	of	aspects	of	human	experience	–	vulnerability	and	strength,	loneliness	and	partnership,	shame	and	pride,	and	much	more	–	that	point	towards	an	uneasy	trajectory	in	which	futural	possibilities	may	be	generated.		The	SCAR	Project	is	only	one	example	of	a	place	where	mimetic	forces	prove	their	power,	providing	us	uneasy	catalysts	in	reclaiming	and	diversifying	cultural	images	of	illness	and	disease.	Another	example	that	diversifies	images	connected	with	breast	cancer,	and	does	so	from	the	perspective	of	the	artist’s	personal	sphere,	is	the	work	of	artist	Hannah	Wilke.25	In	her	Portrait	of	the	Artist	with	Her	Mother	
Selma	Butter	from	the	So	Help	Me	Hannah	Series	(1978–81),	the	artist	portrays	her	own	body	as	well	as	that	of	her	mother,	ravaged	by	disease,	in	a	diptych	format.	Through	juxtaposition,	duplicating	her	mother’s	wounds	on	her	own	body	as	anatomical	artifacts,	Wilke	shows	that	the	meaning	of	terminal	illness	is	not	limited	to	the	individual,	but	finds	its	axis	in	the	shared	sphere	of	living-and-dying	together.	If	Sloterdijk,	following	Levinas,	is	correct	in	assuming	that	death	is	mostly	experienced	in	terms	of	the	one	witnessing	death,	and	if	death	ultimately	implies	more	the	dissolution	of	a	shared	sphere	rather	than	only	the	death	of	an	individual	being	(Sloterdijk,	2011,	48),	then	the	image	that	the	artist	renders	here	of	illness	and	finitude	–	“having	literally	incorporated	her	mother,	illness	and	all”	(Jones,	1998,	189)	–	speaks	to	the	fact	that	images	of	illness	need	to	refer	to	this	network	of	co-fragility	and	speak	to	our	“shared	existential	risk”	(Sloterdijk,	2016,	48).			 These	examples	are	limited,	and	many	more	could	be	given.	Still,	they	provide	brief	glimpses	into	another,	complementary	realm	of	image-creation,	where	images	engage	those	elements	of	affectively	living	in-and-with-illness	that	are	too	often	forgotten	or	denied	in	the	cultural	sphere,	or	not	seen	within	the	discourse	of	medicine	itself:	the	scars	remaining,	the	emotional	impact	on	families,	the	shared	spheres	of	suffering.	In	their	artistic	renderings	of	such	scars	and	emotional	impacts,	the	SCAR	Project	and	Wilke’s	art	may	not	quite	evoke	the	pleasure,	or	higher	reality,	that	Aristotle	and	Hegel	associate	with	artistic	renditions	of	that	which	we	usually	find	horrific	(IJsseling,	1993,	350),	but	those	artworks	provide,	through	aesthetic	abstraction,	affirmation	of	–	and	solidarity	with	–	the	felt	experiences	that	are	otherwise	not,	or	hardly,	acknowledged.	In	this	way,	they	may	open	up	to	alternate	windows	of	creating	meaning	with	and	through	the	unique	lived	experience	of	having	breast	cancer.	While	the	clinical	picture	connects	to	the	empirical	reality	of	disease,	the	aesthetic	picture	gives	voice	to	the	multiperspectival,	existential	space	of	living-and-dying	with	illness,	which	may	include	altered	relationships	(e.g.	in																																																									25	See	http://withreferencetodeath.philippocock.net/blog/wilke-hannah-in-memorium-selma-butter-mommy-1979/	Accessed	June	22,	2017.	With	special	thanks	to	my	colleague	Paula	Birnbaum	for	pointing	me	to	Wilke’s	art.		
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terms	of	both	isolation	and	solidarity),	revised	perceptions	of	beauty,	and	changed	assessments	on	what	work	and	being	‘productive’	in	society	means.		Still	much	more	needs	to	be	done	to	promote	the	field	of	aesthetics	to	produce	additional	epistemic	tools	that	contextualize	and	complement	the	images	of	disease	that	our	culture	and	the	medical	discourse	offer.	Nevertheless,	projects	and	artworks	such	as	The	SCAR	Project	and	Wilke’s	art	provide	impetus	for	ever-spreading	alternatives,	which	take	on	the	ambiguity	and	productivity	of	images,	so	as	to	spread	and	diversify	the	meanings	of	images	of	disease,	and	to	generate	new	futural	orientations	for	those	who	really	need	it.26			
		
	 	
																																																								26	I	am	thankful	to	the	anonymous	reviewers	of	this	journal	for	their	comments	on	this	article.	I	owe	special	gratitude	to	those	who	–	many	years	ago	–	helped	me	to	develop	this	project	on	mimesis	and	clinical	pictures,	and	in	particular	Matthias	Karger.	A	special	note	of	gratitude	is	also	due	to	Daniel	O’Connell,	whose	constructive,	honest,	and	critical	feedback	improved	the	content	and	argument	of	this	paper	in	remarkable	and	substantial	ways.	I	am	also	grateful	to	my	research	assistants	Heather	Fox,	Stan	O’Neill	and	Lincoln	Stefanello	for	their	fruitful	suggestions	and	editorial	assistance	with	this	article.	My	USF	colleagues	Paula	Birnbaum	and	Michael	Torre	helped	me	with	refining	important	elements	of	my	analysis.	I	also	benefited	from	the	feedback	of	the	participants	of	the	2014	Annual	Meeting	of	the	Pacific	Association	of	the	Continental	Tradition	(PACT)	at	Loyola	Marymount	University,	and	specifically	the	comments	from	Dorothea	Olkowski,	Sam	Talcott,	and	Peter	Warnek.		
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